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ABSTRACT
Evaluating the Impacts of Hurricane Maria on the Residential Construction
Industry in Puerto Rico and the Effectiveness
of Reconstruction Efforts
M. Bradley Wells
School of Technology, BYU
Master of Science
In September of 2017, Hurricane Irma and Hurricane Maria, both category 5 hurricanes,
swept across the Caribbean, including the U.S. Territory island of Puerto Rico. These two
storms, particularly Hurricane Maria, caused catastrophic damages from high winds and flooding
to the island paradise. This research investigates the direct effects that Hurricane Maria had on
the residential construction industry within Puerto Rico and evaluates how to better prioritize and
manage these types of efforts in the future. This research was initiated to identify challenges and
opportunities that have been encountered within the Puerto Rican construction industry during
the first year of reconstruction, post-Hurricane Maria. Residential structures that were built
using current building codes experienced minimal storm damage. Many of the damaged
residential structures, on the other hand, were made up of informal construction, predominantly
using light wood framing methods. Unfortunately, homes built using informal construction
practices were not insured nor eligible for government rebuilding assistance. Therefore, these
damaged structures will more than likely be rebuilt using informal building practices again.
Other immediate challenges faced by the construction industry included finding skilled labor and
creating access to resources. The results of this research can be used to help prioritize
reconstruction efforts and provide best practices following other similar disasters that will
inevitably occur in the future. This research is unique in that it specifically targets the
construction industry’s experience and ultimately the ability to increase the effectiveness of the
critical role the construction industry plays in rebuilding efforts.
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INTRODUCTION

Overview of Research
In September 2017, Hurricane Maria formed in the Atlantic Ocean and swept across the
Caribbean, including the U.S. Territory island of Puerto Rico, as a category 5 hurricane. The
hurricane’s path passed directly over the island of Puerto Rico causing massive, widespread
destruction across the island. The island had already been hit by another devastating storm,
Hurricane Irma, just two weeks prior, weakening structures and infrastructure and thus
magnifying the damaging effects of Maria. Hurricane Maria is regarded as the worst natural
disaster on record to affect Puerto Rico, with total losses from the hurricane estimated at over
$90 billion (USD) (NCEI, 2020). Catastrophic damage from high winds and flooding occurred
to homes, businesses, and critical infrastructure, including an already weakened electrical grid
that had been severely damaged by Hurricane Irma. Much of the informal residential
construction (a project built without formal architectural / engineered plans or without permits)
was destroyed, leaving thousands of people homeless in the aftermath of the storm. The entire
island was without power and cellular phone service. The highway system across the island was
impassable due to major flooding that destroyed roadways and overpasses, and from fallen and
scattered debris from the hurricane force winds. A major humanitarian crisis ensued due to a
lack of emergency resources and a slow relief process.
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There were several significant inefficiencies and challenges reported during the initial
rebuilding efforts in Puerto Rico following Hurricane Maria. This research investigates the
direct effects that Hurricane Maria had on the residential construction industry within Puerto
Rico and evaluates how to better prioritize and manage these types of efforts in the future. One
major assumption typically made in post-disaster environments is that the construction industry
can simply jump in and begin rebuilding homes. However, there are certainly many challenges
faced by the construction industry to effectively put the pieces back together in a disaster
reconstruction environment.
This research was initiated to identify challenges and opportunities that have been
encountered within the Puerto Rican construction industry during the first year of reconstruction,
post-Hurricane Maria. It is anticipated that the construction industry encountered challenges
with scheduling, labor, material resources, payment structures (including disaster relief and
insurance funding), general day-to-day business practices, and other similar challenges.
Additionally, there is tremendous potential for low quality reconstruction and lack of building
code enforcement, which in turn leads to future negative consequences. The results of this
research can be used to help prioritize reconstruction efforts and provide best practices following
other similar disasters that will inevitably occur in the future. This research is unique in that it
specifically targets the construction industry’s experience. This research looks at the critical role
the construction industry plays in the effectiveness of rebuilding efforts. This research focuses
primarily on residential reconstruction efforts on the Island of Puerto Rico approximately one
year after the hurricane hit the island. This research was performed in conjunction with another
research thesis targeting Hurricane Maria’s effects on the commercial and heavy civil
construction industry in Puerto Rico.
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Purpose of the Research
The purpose of this research was to collect data that would help identify challenges and
opportunities associated with residential construction/reconstruction efforts approximately 1 year
after Hurricane Maria made landfall in Puerto Rico. The data was gathered through a combined
two-part approach: first, interviews were conducted with people and/or organizations directly
affected by the hurricane; and second, data was gathered through first-hand observation of oneyear post disaster reconstruction circumstances, efforts, and outstanding needs.
As a construction professional for over 20 years, I have worked in the South and
Intermountain West areas of the United States. During my career, I have built over 640,000
square feet of residential and light commercial structures. After learning of the devastation to
homes and buildings in Puerto Rico, my interest was piqued to understand why the destruction
was so catastrophic. With the assistance of Doctor Clifton Farnsworth, a construction
management professor at Brigham Young University, we implemented a plan to travel to Puerto
Rico approximately 1 year after Hurricane Maria made landfall on the island to see firsthand
some of the damages and to learn how the construction industry was playing a role in the
rebuilding efforts of the island. Our hope was to gather information about construction
processes, methods, and deficiencies to gain a better understanding of why there was so much
destruction, particularly in residential construction.

Research Approach
This research was deliberately timed to correspond with exploring how the reconstruction
efforts were proceeding approximately one year after the storm devastated the island. The
reasoning for that approach was to allow time for critical infrastructure to be back in place and
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hope that some sense of normal / routine life was moving forward again. This included talking
to different stakeholders (e.g., construction companies, architects / engineers, and homeowners)
to determine how the construction industry had been affected by the rebuilding efforts taking
place on the island after the devastation.
This research included several objectives. First, we wanted to find out what processes
were utilized for rebuilding, i.e., clearing road access, ensuring people had the basics of life
including food, water, and secure shelter, and rebuilding their homes, etc. Second, we were
interested in current opportunities and challenges that could be identified at the one-year mark.
In other words, what was going well, and where could improvements be made. Third, it was
important to learn how the residential construction industry had been affected by the hurricane,
and just as important to determine the outlook for the industry moving away from more
immediate response and transitioning into more long-term reconstruction efforts. Fourth, this
research helps bridge the perspectives of different stakeholders and explore the connections with
the residential construction industry.

Limitations
Our visit to Puerto Rico spanned 12 days. While we were able to collect valuable data,
we were limited to what we could accomplish in that time frame with no opportunity to return
for data relating to progress over the year after that visit. We conducted many interviews with
residents and authorities in Puerto Rico through prescheduled appointments and spontaneous
interview requests with those we contacted along the way including both business owners and
homeowners. Many of the one-on-one impromptu interviews did not allow for follow up
interviews. Because of the magnitude of the damage, it was known that this research would not
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“solve” any specific problems associated with the rebuilding effort. However, it was anticipated
that this research would play an important role in helping define the opportunities and challenges
faced by the residential construction industry, and ultimately allow for further research
opportunities. Therefore, this research also included the exploration of other areas for future
research rather than determining definite conclusions. Still, it was hoped that the results of this
research would help bridge the perspectives of different stakeholders and explore the connections
with the residential construction industry.

Definitions of Terms
Informal Construction - Construction method that includes building a structure without
architectural / engineered plans or building without a building permit. In Puerto Rico, most
informal construction utilizes light wood framed construction.
FEMA Blue Tarps - Temporary (blue colored) plastic tarp distributed by the Federal
Emergency Management Association to temporarily cover and protect homes due to damages
caused by the hurricane to a structure’s roof system.
Residential Construction - Construction method for the common purpose of building a
residence / home for people to occupy. In Puerto Rico this means homes that are typically less
than 3 stories in height.
Reinforced Concrete Home - A structure made of grout-filled CMU blocks and
reinforcing steel. These walls are typically plastered. Although not true reinforced concrete,
these structures are typically referred to as such in Puerto Rico.
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2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Overview
An important element within any research project is the literature review. The purpose of
the literature review is to define the problem being explored and to demonstrate the boundaries
of knowledge regarding the problem. There are three principal objectives in this literature
review. First, describe Hurricanes Irma and Maria and the associated damage. Second, explore
the federal and local response. Third, identify the impacts to the residential construction sector
and their response for disaster reconstruction.

2017 Hurricanes in Puerto Rico

2.2.1

Hurricane Irma
The best source of information defining Hurricane Irma and associated damage is from the

official Hurricane Irma Tropical Cyclone Report (Cangialosi et al., 2018). The following
information was taken from this report.
On September 6, 2017, the eye of Hurricane Irma (a category 5 hurricane) tracked about 50
nautical miles north of the northern shore of Puerto Rico. The eye of Hurricane Irma did not
make landfall on Puerto Rico, but sustained winds of 48 knots and wind gusts of 64 knots were
recorded on the island. Irma caused lowland flooding on the island. Although Puerto Rico did
not experience a direct hit from Hurricane Irma, rainfall totals between 10 and 15 inches
6

occurred over high elevations over the central portion of the island, causing many areas of the
island to be saturated. The heavy rains and tropical storm force winds caused widespread power
outages and minor damage to homes and businesses. Weak (informal) structures on the island
collapsed and many trees were uprooted. A near-total loss of electricity and the water supply for
several days also occurred because of Hurricane Irma. Hurricane Irma left Puerto Rico in a
weakened state with only two weeks to recover before another massive hurricane made landfall
on the island (Cangialosi et al., 2018).

2.2.2

Hurricane Maria
The best source for information defining Hurricane Maria and associated damage is from

the official Hurricane Maria Tropical Cyclone Report (Pasch et al., 2019). The following
information was taken from this report.

Figure 2-1: Hurricane Maria centered on Puerto Rico (from NWS, 2017).
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On September 20, 2017, Hurricane Maria, (a massive category 5 hurricane) which had
formed in the Gulf of Mexico made direct landfall in Puerto Rico. Maria originated from a welldefined tropical wave that departed the west coast of Africa on September 12, 2017. The system
moved westward over the tropical Atlantic for the next few days. By September 15th, showers
and thunderstorms increased and began to show signs of organization, with some curved cloud
bands developing. Deep convection then quickly became more consolidated and better
organized, and it is estimated that a tropical depression formed about 580 miles east of Barbados.
Figure 2-1 shows the path of the hurricane centered over Puerto Rico (NWS, 2017).
Moving westward the cyclone strengthened into a tropical storm on September 16th.
Maria turned toward the west-northwest shortly thereafter, and quickly intensified into a
hurricane on the 17th of September. While situated in an environment of warm sea surface
temperatures and light vertical shear, the hurricane strengthened rapidly. Maria became a major
hurricane by September 18, and just 12 hours later it neared Dominica and became a category 5
hurricane with maximum winds of 145 knots (Pasch et al, 2019).
After striking Dominica, Maria continued moving to the northeastern Caribbean Sea.
Slight weakening had occurred due to the system’s interaction with the mountainous island of
Dominica, but the hurricane soon regained intensity and strengthened to its peak on the 20th of
September while centered about 25 miles south of St. Croix. Maria moved northwestward
toward Puerto Rico and after reaching maximum intensity, underwent an eyewall replacement
with an outer eyewall becoming more dominant by the time the center of the system reached
Puerto Rico. Maria’s center crossed the southeast coast of Puerto Rico near Yabucoa September
20th, and the hurricane’s maximum winds at that time were just below the threshold of category
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5 intensity. The hurricane’s center crossed the island, somewhat diagonally from southeast to
northwest, for several hours while slowly emerging into the Atlantic (Pasch et al., 2019).

Figure 2-2: Typical structural damage from Hurricane Maria (from Pasch et al., 2019).

Puerto Rico was devastated by winds and floods. Figure 2-2 and Figure 2-3 show the
typical aftermath to residential structures caused by wind damage and flooding, respectively.
The government estimate of damage in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands due to Maria is
90 billion dollars, which makes Maria the third costliest hurricane in U.S. history, behind Katrina
in 2005 and Harvey in 2017 (NCEI, 2020). The combined effect of the surge and tide produced
maximum inundation levels of 6 to 9 ft above ground level to the north of Maria’s landfall along
the coasts of Humacao, Naguabo, and Ceiba municipalities in Puerto Rico. The destructive
power of storm surge and wave action from Maria produced extensive damage to buildings,
homes, and roads along the east and southeast coast of Puerto Rico. Along these areas, marinas
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and harbors were severely damaged due to the combination of the waves and currents associated
with the surge. Across the island, many buildings suffered significant damage or were
destroyed. Numerous trees were downed, splintered, and/or defoliated. River flooding was
unprecedented in some areas, especially in the northern portion of the island. The La Plata River
flooded the entire alluvial valley including the municipality of Toa Baja, where hundreds of
families needed to be rescued from their roof tops.

Figure 2-3: Flooding & structural damage from Hurricane Maria (from Pasch et al., 2019).

Maria knocked down 80 percent of Puerto Rico’s utility poles and all transmission lines,
resulting in the loss of power to essentially all the island’s 3.4 million residents. Practically all
cell phone service was lost, and municipal water supplies were knocked out. At of the end of
2017, nearly half of Puerto Rico’s residents were still without power; however, by the end of
January 2018, electricity had been restored to about 65% of the island (Pasch et al., 2019).
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It has been determined that Hurricane Maria, a category 4 storm when it made landfall,
has been the worst natural disaster on record in Puerto Rico. The storm caused catastrophic
damage and a record number of fatalities across the Caribbean. Hurricane Maria came just two
weeks after Hurricane Irma, which had already delivered a devastating impact upon St. John and
St. Thomas (Prevatt et al., 2018).
Puerto Rico had not experienced a storm of Maria’s magnitude or intensity in over 80
years (Masters, 2017). Maria’s strong winds were accompanied by heavy rainfall, the second
highest on record for a tropical cyclone in Puerto Rico. With over 80% of river gauges reporting
flood stage levels, flooding and landslides were prevalent, especially in west-central Puerto Rico.
(NWS, 2017). The official death toll was initially set at 64 direct deaths associated with the
hurricane (Sanchez, 2018), but with indirect deaths the estimate is as high as 2,975 (Sanchez,
2018; Milken Institute, 2018).
On a trip to the island in December 2017, Randy Noel, who served as that year’s
chairman of the board for the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB), was particularly
struck by what he saw in the community of Toa Baja, which sustained 11 feet of floodwaters
during Maria. He noticed every structure built of wood was ruined, while the structures built of
concrete were standing, though most had suffered roof and window damage (Croce, 2018). The
exact numbers from Maria’s damage have varied. Emilio Colón Zavala, president of the Puerto
Rico Builders Association, said the devastating storm significantly damaged 250,000 housing
units, including 35,000 that were completely destroyed (Croce, 2018). Brown (2018) indicated
that the damage may have been even more extensive and widespread than what others had
reported, with more than 400,000 houses in need of reconstruction and repairs, representing
some level of damage to a third of the 1.2 million houses on the island.
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Despite the damage, Puerto Rico has adopted some of the most stringent building codes
in the U.S., but its housing stock was still vulnerable when Maria swept ashore. According to
Zavala, 55% of the island’s housing stock was built “informally,” meaning without the proper
permits and not to the island’s building codes, which stipulate that structures must be able to
withstand wind speeds of at least 145 mph. (Croce, 2018). Zavala indicated “homes that were
built according to the existing building code were significantly less damaged than the ones that
were built noncompliant to code.” Zavala further cited a statistic from the Federal Emergency
Management Agency that stated 98% of the homes it assessed after Maria which were built to
any code sustained little to no structural damage (Croce, 2018). Gary Ehrlich, a senior program
manager of structural codes and standards at the NAHB, says that since 2000 when the first
editions of the International Building Code and International Residential Code were published,
structures built to more modern codes have fared much better than those “built to some legacy
codes or not constructed to a building code at all” (Croce 2018). In the United States, roughly
60% of communities have a building code in place, Ehrlich said, and the ones that do not are
typically in rural areas that lack the resources to enforce one (Croce, 2018). It is reasonably clear
from the literature review that the problem with the massive hurricane damage to residential
structures did not stem from inadequate building codes, but rather a lack of regulation and
enforcement of those codes.
When Hurricane Maria devastated Puerto Rico, the disaster quickly became a
humanitarian crisis causing the official reconstruction process to become difficult to navigate and
inaccessible to many property owners (Talbot et al., 2019). Nearly a year after the hurricane hit
it was reported that only 40% of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) financial
assistance applications had been approved and 80% of appeal cases were still pending or had
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already been denied (Acevedo, 2018). A number of studies have predicted that the residential
structural damage will have a significant long-term effect upon the population of the island. The
Center for Puerto Rican Studies, based at New York’s Hunter College, estimates that Puerto Rico
may lose up to 470,000 residents, or 14% of the population, within the first two years after the
hurricane. Jennifer Hinojosa, research associate and data center coordinator for the organization,
estimates that between 114,000 and 213,000 Puerto Rico residents will leave the island annually
for the first two years in Maria’s aftermath (Croce, 2018).

Federal and Local Responses
The 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season was one of the most active seasons in U.S. History.
In the three weeks between August 25th and September 20th, hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and
Maria made landfall in quick succession. These hurricanes were followed by devastating
wildfires in California. It was a highly active natural disaster year. Collectively, hurricanes
Harvey, Irma, and Maria caused $265 billion in damages (NCEI, 2020) and were each
individually among the top five costliest hurricanes on record (see Figure 2-4).

Figure 2-4: Hurricane Maria is among the top costliest US storms (after NCEI, 2020).
13

On the 25th August, Hurricane Harvey made landfall in Texas as a category 4 storm and
stalled over the Houston area for several days and set a record for the most rainfall from a U.S.
tropical cyclone. Twelve days later, on September 6th, Hurricane Irma became one of the
strongest Atlantic hurricanes on record. The center of the storm passed just north of the U.S.
Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. Hurricane Irma was the first major hurricane to make landfall in
Florida since 2005.
On September 20th, just fourteen days later, Hurricane Maria made landfall in Puerto Rico
as a category 4 storm. Maria was the first category 4 storm to make landfall on Puerto Rico in
85 years. Following the storm, every airport and seaport in Puerto Rico was closed and even
after reopening had limited capacity for approximately seven days post-landfall due to
restrictions. Less than 12 percent of the territory’s population had access to cell phone service in
the aftermath of the storm. Most of the main island’s power grid was down until November 17th
(nearly two months, with outages continuing through May 2018) which left Puerto Rico’s 3.7
million residents without electricity.
FEMA had an overly busy year in 2017. Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria affected 28
million people in Texas, Florida, US Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. In 2017, FEMA supported
59 major disaster declarations and 16 emergency declarations. By April 30th, 2018, FEMA had
obligated $21.2 billion towards the impact of these hurricanes, including disaster assistance to
survivors and the affected communities. The planning assumptions for a hurricane, earthquake,
or tsunami striking Puerto Rico underestimated the actual needs in 2017. This required FEMA to
depend on crisis action planning during the incident to address the shortfalls in the planning
assumptions. Figure 2-5 shows that for the percent of population impacted, cellular service
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impacted, power outages, hospitals impacted, and search and rescue needs where the planned
response significantly underestimated the actual effects of the hurricanes.

Figure 2-5: Underestimated planning assumptions for FEMA needs for 2017
hurricanes (after FEMA, 2018).

The FEMA disaster planning assumptions did not plan for unmaintained infrastructure
(e.g., the electrical grid and transmission power lines) or address the financial liquidity
challenges facing the territorial government. The devastating impacts experienced across the
infrastructure sectors, compounded by deferred maintenance issues, severely complicated the
private sector’s ability to return to normal life. FEMA did not anticipate the massive
requirements to directly assist electricity, telecommunications, and fuel sector utilities with air
and sea movement. Additionally, in Puerto Rico the fiscal pressures limited investments and
maintenance in critical infrastructure, including the electrical system, and decreased funding for
emergency management. When Hurricane Maria hit Puerto Rico, the territory was $74 billion in
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debt and its economy had contracted nearly 15 percent during the previous 10 years. The island
was in a recession (FEMA 2018).
The FEMA after action report also concluded that with the severity of three concurrent
major hurricanes it required FEMA to deploy a high number of staff to each affected area.
FEMA leadership recognized early on with the unprecedented demands for staff to support the
widescale response efforts, in addition to other existing response and recovery operations for
other disasters, the need would exceed the agency’s planned capabilities (FEMA 2018).
Many media outlets and local Puerto Rican government officials were critical of FEMA
stating that the organization was not assisting sufficiently and was leaving many people destitute
on the island. Even though FEMA had a major catastrophe plan in place, the sheer magnitude of
three major hurricanes overwhelmed their capacity. Many resources were already in play when
Hurricane Maria struck Puerto Rico. It then took FEMA longer to get supplies and personnel to
assist in the aftermath of Maria as compared to Harvey and Irma.
FEMA partners supplied commodities via ground transportation to areas impacted by
Hurricanes Harvey and Irma, but the responses to Puerto Rico introduced the complexity of
supporting a logistics supply chain that stretched outside the U.S. mainland. Hurricane Maria
caused extensive damage to island seaports, airports, and roads. These factors also limited the
island’s ability to receive commodity shipments immediately after the Hurricane. FEMA
maintained a stockpile of commodities at the Caribbean Distribution Center warehouse in Puerto
Rico to facilitate a quick response to incidents in both Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands,
but in response to needs from Hurricane IRMA, FEMA distributed more than 80 percent of its
inventory for selected commodities from the Caribbean Distribution Center warehouse. Table 2-
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1 shows a summary of the supplies used in response to Hurricane Irma. Unfortunately,
Hurricane Maria struck before the supplies were replenished (FEMA 2018).

Table 2-1: Supplies used in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Irma (After FEMA, 2017).
Commodity
Water (liters)
Meals
Cots
Medical Kits
Tarps
Blue Roof Sheeting

On 9/1/17
718,370
250,572
4,422
8
13,272
15,344

On 9/15/17
69,300
97,632
0
6
0
180

% Change
▼ 90%
▼ 61%
▼ 100%
▼ 25%
▼ 100%
▼ 99%

Given the unprecedented resource needs of consecutive response operations, FEMA not
only exhausted commodities on hand but also exhausted pre-negotiated contracts to provide
meals, tarps, water, and other resources during the responses to hurricanes Harvey and Irma.
The ensuing response for Hurricane Maria required FEMA to rapidly solicit vendors outside its
pre-negotiated contracts to satisfy resource and program needs (FEMA, 2017). After reviewing
the planning and adjustment methods of FEMA during the 2017 Hurricane Season, the critical
media response was unjustified and was likely politically motivated.
There are likely many factors as to why the federal response differed. Access was much
more limited on the island of Puerto Rico as opposed to the mainland states. Power grid issues
were so much greater on the island of Puerto Rico (due to maintenance neglect) and resources
were limited due to its remote location (Willison, et al., 2019). It seems evident that the response
times were different at critical times and the delays experienced in Puerto Rico only added to the
devastating effects of the hurricane. One of the first appropriations of federal money in the
history of the USA was for disaster aid relief, emphasizing the critical importance of the federal
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government’s responsibility to aid its citizens in the case of natural disasters (Willison et al.,
2019). The research results show that the federal response was quicker and more generous with
money and staffing to Hurricanes Harvey and Irma in Texas and Florida, likely because those
storms landed first, compared with Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico. Hurricanes Harvey and Irma
made landfall as category 4 hurricanes, and Maria hit Puerto Rico as a ‘high-end’ category 4, or
just below the threshold of a category 5 hurricane (Willison et al., 2019). Because of this, Maria
caused more damage in Puerto Rico than Irma in Florida or Harvey in Texas in terms of loss of
electricity and housing destruction, with overall damage estimates comparable to Harvey, and
greater than estimates for Irma. Assuming that infrastructure costs are higher in Texas and
Florida compared with Puerto Rico, the high damage estimates in Puerto Rico emphasize the
severity of storm damage. We also assume that disaster responses should reflect the needs due to
the degree of damages and need of the population. (Willison et al., 2019).

Residential Disaster Reconstruction
Maria caused extensive damages in almost every aspect of the infrastructure and the
natural and human-built environments. Cruzado (2018) presented an overview of the damages to
the energy infrastructure, highway signs, traffic signals, luminaires, steel roofs, wood and
concrete homes, multistory buildings, and bridges. Two case studies were presented: a highway
sign, for which estimates of wind speed based on backward calculations were presented, and a
reinforced concrete roof that was damaged by wind loads. The authors of this study
recommended increasing the design wind speed for the Puerto Rico Building Code (Cruzado et
al., 2018). They based this conclusion on poorly built structures made mostly of wood and
corrugated metal that could not withstand the gale winds of Hurricane Maria. Roofs were simply
ripped from structures. Most of the wood structured homes that had been built were not
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designed by engineers, therefore not designed to withstand the hurricane force winds. On the
other hand, reinforced concrete homes generally withstood the storm well. Cruzado et al. (2018)
further concluded that implementing minimum requirements for building as well as inspections
would be beneficial in creating structures that will better withstand climate events.
Although the government estimate for Hurricane Maria damage is $90 Billion (NCEI,
2020), others have estimated the damage higher ranging from between $94 Billion (LlorensVelez, 2017) to $102 Billion (Masters, 2017). The storm knocked out power to all of Puerto Rico
and destroyed communication services and weather monitoring systems (Cruzado et al., 2018).
Cost estimates for the actual damage associated with only residential structures is more difficult
to ascertain. However, the literature is relatively clear on where the damage occurred within the
residential sector. For the most part, reinforced concrete homes withstood hurricane winds quite
well. Damages that occurred to reinforced concrete homes did not tend to affect the structural
integrity of the home. Rather, minor damage was common with non-structural elements such as
windows and doors, or from water damage where leaking occurred. Although most of the
reinforced concrete structures resisted the hurricane wind loads, several reinforced concrete
houses and buildings suffered extensive damage from landslides and developed scouring of soil
in the foundation area (Cruzado et al., 2018). Further, most multistory buildings on the island
are predominantly made of reinforced concrete. There were not any multistory structures that
collapsed due to hurricane winds, although they were noted to sustain other non-structural related
damages (e.g., doors, windows, parapets, etc.) (Cruzado and Pacheco-Crosetti, 2018).
The most widespread damage to residential structures occurred to informally built wood
framed structures that were not designed or built to withstand the hurricane force winds. For
generations in Puerto Rico, informal home construction has been more the rule than the
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exception, especially in towns and rural areas outside of San Juan. This is one reason why
Hurricane Maria caused such widespread and calamitous destruction as it tore across the entire
island (Viglucci, 2018). The island’s building codes are equal to Florida’s windstorm rules, at
least on paper. But enforcement is wildly uneven, say industry insiders. It is estimated that as
much as half of the housing on the island was built without permits, according to Puerto Rico
government officials. No one knows precisely how much of that there is, but the government’s
housing secretary Fernando Gil stated there could be as many illegally built structures as the
roughly one million legal dwellings on the island (Viglucci, 2018). Other estimates of
informally built houses present on the island before Hurricane Maria range from 260,000 to
700,000 homes – which constitutes 60% of total homes on the island (Brown, 2018; Florido,
2018; Suarez, 2018). After the hurricanes, 1.1 million Puerto Rican households requested help
from FEMA, and approximately 58% were denied. Among those who appealed, 75% were
rejected again. The median grant given to repair homes in Puerto Rico was $1,800 (Robles and
Patel, 2018).
Housing units considered ‘informal’ (or ‘illegal construction’) are a more common method
of construction in rural communities; where residents often sell or inherit properties through
informal agreements, subdivide land without completing the title process, occupy government
owned land to build homes, or build a house without completing the construction permitting
process. Informal housing reconstruction is defined in this research as design and construction
by community members to establish permanent features of housing without following formal
construction procedures or codes (Talbot et al., 2019). The informal construction often comes in
the form of family providing sweat equity, building without inspections, or reusing scrap
material. Repairing or rebuilding illegally erected dwellings to meet building codes is difficult,
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if not nearly impossible. Many such homes are located in flood zones or unstable hillsides where
rules may not allow rebuilding (Viglucci, 2018).
Many informally built communities originated in invasions of public or private land by
squatters — often abetted by local politicians and grandfathered in after the fact — residents
often had no title to their lots, which meant FEMA could not pay for repairs, though it could help
them relocate (Viglucci, 2018). Because of the extremely large number of informally built
homes, many Puerto Rican residents were unable to receive the necessary resources for repairs
and reconstruction due to the stringent, but necessary, regulations on housing aid eligibility and
formal disaster recovery programs. Therefore, many residents resorted back to some sort of
informal construction methods to reconstruct their houses, relying on their own efforts and
resources for reconstruction, often through the help of local community and family relationships.
This process of rebuilding through self and community supported efforts is known is social
capital (Talbot et al., 2019). Social capital represents the features of social organizations such as
relationships, networks and trust which bring a wide range of benefits including coordination and
cooperation (Portes, 2000). These resources are essential in the immediate aftermath of a
disaster as it allows communities to mobilize which ultimately facilitates survival, improves
access, and creates empowerment in a community (Aldrich, 2015; Nakagawa and Shaw, 2004).
Most residents whose homes were damaged are not willing to wait, perhaps for years, for
government help. Many began rebuilding soon after the storm, salvaging materials or buying
inexpensive plywood and zinc at the hardware store to “slap” homes back together, relying
strictly on social capital. Most poor Puerto Ricans are unlikely to pay architects or engineers to
draw up plans or absorb the costs of permits or better building materials required to meet code
(Viglucci, 2018). Previous research suggests that social capital increased access to resources and
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the reconstruction process (Aldrich, 2015). However, because this form of social capital
appeared to also continue to perpetuate the cycle of informal construction, there is still more to
learn from an area like Puerto Rico which experienced extensive devastation and has a historical
lack of residential construction code enforcement (Talbot et al., 2019).
A critical challenge in disaster recovery is to address short term needs quickly, with the
foresight of avoiding the creation of new or worsening existing long-term social needs that can
contribute to a community’s future disaster vulnerability (Finucane et al., 2020). In studies of
disasters and disaster risk reduction, vulnerability is commonly defined as “a measure of the
propensity of an object, area, individual, group, community, country, or other entity to incur the
consequences of a hazard” (Coppola, 2015). Often, the urgent, short-term pressures during the
aftermath of disaster recovery result in the longer-term vulnerability reduction being overlooked
as a fundamental block of the recovery process (Finucane et al., 2020). Principles of disaster risk
reduction and management emphasize that post-disaster recovery and development need to be
informed by effective resilience building and community engagement and empowerment
strategies (Finucane, 2020). In other words, there should be more emphasis placed on rebuilding
with resiliency in mind.
A group of journalists from the New York Times visited Puerto Rico around the same
timeframe as the research team from Brigham Young University visited the island. The Times
journalists visited 163 homes in two neighborhoods in Punta Santiago to document the progress
that had been made after 12 months since Hurricane Maria made landfall. They observed a
community with signs of fresh paint and, in some of the middle-class parts of town, rebuilt
rooms and new furniture. But in neighborhoods where the residents live on small pensions and
disability benefits, there were still gutted kitchens and electrical wiring running randomly along
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unfinished walls. Roofs were covered still with plywood or plastic, appearing to perhaps
collapse at any moment. Some homes still had no running water. Several families lived in
single rooms in unfurnished houses, sleeping on the floor (Robles and Patel, 2018). Figure 2-6
shows the widespread number of homes in a poor neighborhood still covered with “temporary”
blue tarps multiple years after the hurricanes hit Puerto Rico. This suggests that many of the
issues discussed in this literature review continue to hamper reconstruction efforts within the
residential sector.

Figure 2-6: Aerial view of Loiza, Puerto Rico, 2020 (from Google, 2020).

Summary
In summary, this literature review has shown that the larger gap is not in understanding
that damage occurred to residential structures. The damaging effects of Hurricane Irma and
Maria on homes in Puerto Rico and the challenges associated with rebuilding are well
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established. Rather, the larger gap appears to be a disconnect between residential homeowner’s
reconstruction needs and their expectation of government assistance, local government decision
makers and pre-storm readiness efforts, and the reconstruction demands placed on the residential
construction industry. The intention of this thesis is to explore the challenges and opportunities
that have been encountered within the Puerto Rican residential construction industry, especially
at the interface with the various stakeholders (i.e., homeowners, government officials, and the
residential construction industry itself). There is little direct information in the literature on how
the residential construction industry has been affected by the hurricanes, and this research was
established to explore the construction industry’s role in the reconstruction efforts.
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3

METHODOLOGY

Introduction
The purpose of this research was to collect data that would help us identify residential
construction/reconstruction approximately 1 year after Hurricane Maria made landfall in Puerto
Rico. The data was gathered through a combined two part-approach. The principal form of data
gathering was performed by conducting interviews with people and/or organizations directly
affected by the hurricane. The secondary form of data gathering was through first-hand
observation of one-year post disaster reconstruction circumstances, efforts, and needs.
In this research we wanted to find out what processes were utilized for rebuilding efforts
associated with residential construction (e.g., clearing road access, ensuring people had food and
water - basics of life, secure shelter - safe places for people to live, and rebuilding roads,
infrastructure, homes, etc.). We were also interested in learning about current deficiencies at the
one-year mark. Finally, we were also curious to observe the outlook of the residential
construction industry following Hurricane Maria.
Our plan was to review how the reconstruction process was proceeding approximately a
year after the storm devastated the island. The reasoning for that approach was to allow time for
critical infrastructure to be back in place and hope that some sense of normal / routine life was
moving forward again. Our plans were to talk to construction companies and individual
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homeowners to see how the construction industry had been affected by the rebuilding efforts
taking place on the island after the devastation.

Qualitative Research Approach
This research followed a qualitative approach, meaning the data gathered stemmed from
personal perspective, experiences, and observations of those living in Puerto Rico during and
after Hurricane Maria. Qualitative research takes into account case studies, personal
experiences, cultural matters, interviews, and artifacts. It may also include historical text. As a
field of study, qualitative approaches include research concepts and methods from multiple
established academic fields (Drisko, 2016).
Qualitative methods are best for researching many of the why and how questions of
human experience, in making a decision for example (not just what, where, when, or "who"), and
tend to have a strong basis in the field of sociology to understand government and social
programs (Given, 2008). Qualitative research is widely used by political science, social work,
and education researchers (Alasuutari, 2010).
The data gathered for this research was predominantly qualitative because it included
open-ended questions, allowing for free response during the interviews. This project was based
on two different qualitative research approaches: case study and phenomenology research. A
case study involves an in-depth exploration of an event, a process, or an individual (Creswell,
2009). Cases are bound by activity or a timeline. Case research includes detailed information
gathered using varied procedures during a given period of time (Creswell, 2009). This research
fits the case study criteria due to the event of the hurricane and the timeline of the one-year mark.
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The research included several interviews which spoke to the human experience both during and
following the event.
Phenomenology research approach involves gathering information via verbal descriptions
based on the individual’s perception of an event (Marques and McCall, 2005). It may include
elements and underlying factors that make up their experiences. This research is gained through
in-depth interviews, which we conducted with local construction professionals, local government
authorities, and local residents.

Survey Instrument
This research was done utilizing a cross-sectional survey. A cross-sectional survey
collects data to make inferences about a population of interest at one point in time. Crosssectional surveys have been described as snapshots of the populations about which they gather
data (Given, 20008). Using this method of research allowed us to include a snapshot of personal
experiences and current conditions a year after Hurricane Maria. The surveys were conducted
using a semi-structured format (Bricki and Green, 2007). This semi-structured format allowed
for a set of questions with the option to expound based on information given during the
interview. Questions were open ended to chase important developments that occurred during the
interview process.
It was anticipated that the research would yield better results if interviews were
conducted face-to-face. This also gave the flexibility of conducting interviews in either Spanish
or English. There were two principles that helped guide whether we conducted the interview in
Spanish or English. First, is the interviewee comfortable speaking English? Second, if
conducted in English, we considered whether interviewee could effectively communicate in
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English with fluency. If not, we converted the interview over to Spanish. The research team was
comprised of two bilingual individuals: one graduate student comfortable with everyday Puerto
Rican Spanish; the other was also fluent in Spanish, but more comfortable with technical
construction and engineering Spanish terminology because of job experience.
The following baseline questions were developed for this research. These questions were
developed specifically for the construction industry. The approach for interviewing local
government officials and homeowners while on the island was to ask them to share “their story”
of the rebuilding process with the research team. These latter interviews began with the research
team explaining the purpose of the research and then guiding the interview with directed
questions as the interview developed. The contractor questions were also pre-translated into
Spanish to ensure that both options were prepared as needed. The general idea of the
questioning was targeted toward learning how construction practices and processes had changed
due to Hurricane Maria. The baseline contractor questions are shown below.

3.3.1

Baseline Interview Questions - English
1. What types of reconstruction work has your company been involved with since

Hurricane Maria?
2. How does this type of construction work compare to projects you were performing
before Hurricane Maria?
3. What are the biggest opportunities that your company has had since Hurricane Maria?
4. What are the biggest challenges that your company has faced since Hurricane Maria?
5. What factors have hindered the progress of your reconstruction efforts? What are the
bottlenecks in the reconstruction process?
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6. How has your company’s bidding practices changed over the past year? How has
competition been affected?
7. What adaptations to your general business practices has your company made following
Hurricane Maria?
8. How has your ability to procure labor and materials for your projects been affected by
Hurricane Maria? How have you dealt with these challenges?
9. How has your scheduling process been affected over the past year?
10. How has your estimating process been affected over the past year?
11. What type of project delivery has been used for reconstruction projects? Has this
process changed over the past year? If so, how?
12. How have the permitting, plan approval, and inspection processes been affected by
Hurricane Maria?
13. If you could go back, what would you do differently regarding your company’s
efforts following Hurricane Maria?
14. What are some of the biggest lessons your company has learned about performing
disaster reconstruction?
15. What recommendations do you have regarding making disaster reconstruction more
effective for the construction industry?

3.3.2

Baseline Interview Questions - Spanish
1. ¿En qué clase de trabajos de reconstrucción ha participado su empresa desde el

huracán María?
2. ¿Cómo se compara este tipo de trabajo con los proyectos que realizaba antes del
huracán María?
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3. ¿Cuáles son algunas de las mayores oportunidades que su compañía ha tenido desde el
huracán María?
4. ¿Cuáles son algunas de los mayores desafíos que su empresa ha enfrentado desde el
huracán María?
5. ¿Qué factores han obstaculizado el progreso de sus esfuerzos de reconstrucción?
¿Cuáles han sido los desafíos en el proceso de reconstrucción?
6. ¿Cómo han cambiado las prácticas de licitación de su compañía durante el año pasado?
¿Cómo se ha visto afectada la competencia?
7. ¿Qué adaptaciones a sus prácticas comerciales generales ha hecho su compañía
después del huracán María?
8. ¿De qué manera el huracán María ha afectado su capacidad para obtener mano de obra
y materiales para sus proyectos? ¿Cómo has lidiado con estos desafíos?
9. ¿Cómo se ha afectado su proceso de programación de horarios durante el año pasado?
10. ¿Cómo se ha visto afectado su proceso de estimación durante el año pasado?
11. ¿Qué tipo de entrega del proyecto se ha utilizado para proyectos de reconstrucción?
¿Este proceso ha cambiado durante el año pasado? ¿Si es así, cómo?
12. ¿Cómo se han visto afectados los procesos de permisos, aprobación de planos e
inspección por el huracán María?
13. ¿Si pudiera hacerlo de nuevo, qué haría diferente en relación con los esfuerzos de su
compañía después del huracán María?
14. ¿Cuáles son las lecciones más importantes que su empresa ha aprendido sobre la
reconstrucción de desastres?
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15. ¿Qué recomendaciones tiene con respecto a la reconstrucción de desastres para que
sea más efectiva en la industria de la construcción?

IRB Approval
As part of the approval process to perform this research, the research questions were
submitted to the BYU IRB (Brigham Young University, Institutional Review Board). Our
research team had to ensure that we were compliant with established guidelines for conducting
human subjects research. As part of that process we also had to ensure baseline questions were
compliant with the necessary approval process. An application was submitted to the IRB in
conjunction with the permission process to travel to Puerto Rico. The necessary IRB approvals
were given, generally indicating that this research was IRB-exempt, since our research team was
predominantly learning about the effects to companies, business practices, and construction
rebuilding processes.
Our plan for gaining informed consent was through asking each individual for permission
to record and refer to the interview for the purpose of this research. Oral consent was the only
requirement and each interviewee was informed of the purpose of our studies and given the
opportunity to participate or to decline.
We maintained respect for persons by ensuring the autonomy of participants. Our
research team considered any risks an individual might experience by giving an interview. We
maintained confidentiality in our qualitative research by avoiding discussion of other interviews
previously conducted with future interviewees. Those who gave consent to the interview also
agreed to have their name published as needed.
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Sampling
With a limited amount of time allocated to performing interviews while visiting the
island, the interview process needed to be as efficient as possible to maximize our time there.
Therefore, we created a four-part sampling strategy to maximize our efforts in finding qualified
individuals and to create a rich and robust dataset. First, our research included stratified
purposeful sampling, which illustrated the characteristics of subgroups and helped create
comparison of attitudes regarding their experience (Bricki and Green, 2007). This was a useful
approach due to the interviewees having different educational, social, and economic
backgrounds, which framed their perspective during this experience regarding residential
construction. Second, we took a random sampling approach (Bricki and Green, 2007) to making
our initial contacts. We selected construction companies off the AGC roster that were associated
with residential construction. We began with companies located in the most populous areas and
worked outward from there. Third, during our interviews, we employed the snowball or chain
sampling technique (Bricki and Green, 2007). This consisted of asking interviewees for referrals
to other likely participants that may add to our research. This was an effective approach as it led
to additional contacts not listed on the professional directories. Finally, with limited time, one of
our goals was to gather the broad experiences. We followed the general concept of maximum
variation sampling. Maximum variation sampling is purposely selecting a wide range of
variation on dimensions of interest (Bricki and Green, 2007). By incorporating this practice, we
could identify common patterns that cut across the variables.
In general, we interviewed more than just general contractors and those within residential
construction such as construction trade partners. Interview participants included homeowners
who were rebuilding due to the storm. Lastly, our research covered some of the local
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government officials. In a way, this was also a form of a cross-sectional survey. Previously we
defined that type of survey as being at a single point in time. It can also be used to describe
cutting across a broad group of individuals to get as much diversity in response in order
maximize the response across the cross-section of individuals.
Reliability in our research relied on the fact that quantitative research is supported by the
positivist or scientific paradigm that regards the world as made up of observable, measurable
facts (Cypress, 2017). The more times the findings of a study can be replicated, the more stable
or reliable the phenomenon is thought to be (Merriam, 1995). Our interviews with multiple
participants in each subset listed above provided reliability in their observations and experiences,
and each of those responses showed repetition that helped stabilize the data. Validity is broadly
defined as the state of being well grounded or justifiable, relevant, meaningful, logical,
conforming to accepted principles or the quality of being sound, just, and well founded.
(Merriam-Webster, 2020). Thus, validity in qualitative research means “appropriateness” of the
tools, processes, and data (Leung, 2015). All interviews were conducted with individuals with
first-hand experience in their assigned category.
As part of our approach of using maximum variations sampling, we conducted interviews
with the following three different groups on the island to get a wider perspective:
1. We spoke with individuals not associated with the construction industry, but who had
sustained damage or lost their homes due to the hurricane and were working to
rebuild their homes.
2. We spoke with companies / persons working / involved in the construction industry to
find out how reconstruction efforts were going according to their businesses and how
they were affected either positively or negatively regarding Hurricane Maria.
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3. We also spoke with leaders of different municipalities to see how the reconstruction
efforts were going in their provinces and how they prepared for the storm and the
aftermath that followed.

Data Analysis
Automated data analysis was not an option due to the nature of the open-ended questions
in the interview process. Therefore, we relied on manual coding of the data. The general
process we used to analyze the data included inductive coding, which meant we sorted all the
raw data to develop trends and themes in the construction industry, in the local government, and
with the local homeowners. We labeled and organized the data based on the interviewee’s
category (construction, government, homeowner). Within those subsets, we grouped likeresponses together to construct validity and reliability in our research. Once we could identify
themes, we compiled that data into research, which we could then present.
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4

LESSONS LEARNED – OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE

Data Collection
In July 2018, a small research team from the BYU construction management program
traveled to the Island of Puerto Rico. The research team consisted of Dr. Clifton Farnsworth,
construction management professor at BYU, Brad Wells, BYU construction management
graduate student and residential construction company owner, and fellow construction
management graduate student Timothy Barrett. The purpose of the trip was to identify the
progress of the reconstruction efforts on the island following Hurricane Maria. The plan was to
review how reconstruction was progressing approximately one year after the storm devastated
the island. The reasoning for that approach was to allow time for critical infrastructure to be
back in place and hope that some sense of normal / routine life was moving forward again. The
team planned to talk to construction companies and individual homeowners to see how the
construction industry had been affected by the rebuilding efforts that were taking place on the
island after the hurricane devastated the island.
Each day, the research team scheduled interviews with persons and companies that had
been contacted via phone call or email correspondence to schedule a time to meet, or
spontaneous construction site visits were made and asked for permission to talk to the general
contractor and some qualified trade partners. This method was somewhat successful, as many
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people wanted to tell their story regarding the struggles of the past year regarding to the
hurricane rebuilding efforts.
In the afternoons after scheduled appointments were finished, the research team would
travel the island and stop at obvious hurricane-affected areas (quite noticeable by the blue FEMA
tarped roofs). The team knocked on doors to ask if the resident would discuss their situation and
rebuilding efforts. During the visit to Puerto Rico, the research team did not encounter anyone
who did not seem eager to share the experience of their struggles to rebuild including their
efforts and the challenges that accompanied them.
Individual interviews were conducted during the time that the research team was in
Puerto Rico. Table 4-1 shows a summary of the total number of interviews that were conducted
for this research project.

Table 4-1: Interviews conducted in conjunction with this research project.
Category
Government

Construction Industry
Residential Site Visits

Type
Municipality
FEMA
Government Housing
US Forest Service
GSA
Architects
Residential/Commercial
Civil/Infrastructure
AGC
Homeowner

Number of Interviews
3
3
1
1
1
5
8
4
1
12

Interviews were conducted in the following municipalities (see Figure 4-1): Aguadilla,
Arecibo, Barceloneta, Carolina, Fajardo, Guaynabo, Hatillo, Loiza, Mabi, San Juan, San
Sebastian, Toa Baja, and Yabucoa. These generally represent where the largest concentrations of
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people are as well as the locations that were most impacted by the storm. For the research in this
thesis, the key interviews consisted of 3 township mayors and their staff, 5 different architects, 6
engineers, and each of the individual residential site visits that sustained some sort of loss /
damage to their home during the storm.

Figure 4-1: Locations where interviews were conducted for this research project (map
image from Wikimedia Commons, 2020).

Meeting with Local Officials
Interviewing independent township leaders about how Hurricane Maria recovery efforts
went in their respective communities would give the research team an idea of what construction
needs those areas needed. The eastern corner was where the hurricane made landfall and the
research team understood there was quite a bit of residential damage there. The other was a
mountainous region and the research team had heard that they were one of the first areas to
restore power and begin rebuilding and wanted to find out why.
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Figure 4-2: Municipalities where government leaders were interviewed (map image from
Wikimedia Commons, 2020).

4.2.1

San Sebastian
An interview was set up with the mayor of San Sebastian – a township that was lauded as

one of the first to restore power and order to their area. San Sebastian is located in the northwest
part of the island.
The leadership of this township felt that if they displayed a positive attitude of being able
to rebuild, it would help the public have a sense of hope that everything would be all right in the
end. The strong moral and positive attitude of the leadership helped to restore hope in the people
of San Sebastian after the devastation of Hurricane Maria. There are over 16,000 homes in the
township of San Sebastian. There were 427 houses lost due to the storm and over 2,000 more
that needed repairs and restoration due to damages suffered by the storm. The San Sebastian
leadership team calculated that because they were in a more remote mountainous area, that more
populated areas of the island would likely receive outside assistance before they did. Therefore,
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they knew whatever plan they made, it needed to include the possibility that help would not
come soon and they needed to prepare to help themselves.
The San Sebastian hurricane task force met in the mayor’s office soon after the storm to
plan. Their top priority was safety. There was no electricity and the roads were impassible. The
following are actions they implemented to assist immediately after the storm:
1st –Local contractors with heavy equipment were hired to remove debris to open the
roads so residents would have access to the center of town, which would serve as the
main point of assistance.
2nd – A distribution center of food was opened for residents to obtain food for their
families.
3rd – Food was taken and distributed to many incapacitated residents of the township
who could not travel to distribution centers.
4th – Township workers fixed collapsed roads to obtain access to other stranded areas of
the island.
5th – Residents became involved in helping with the rebuilding and recovery efforts.
6th – The township used large generators to get the water system working again even
though there still was not electricity. Tanker trucks were also used in areas near the
dam to deliver water to residents.
7th – In the central part of the town, twenty washing machines were set up for public use
for local residents.
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Approximately two weeks after the hurricane destroyed much of the island, the mayor
and his team realized that federal help to restore electricity to their township would not happen
anytime soon because their township was in a rural, mountainous region of the island. The
mayor and his task force found 3 local retired electrical linemen from the AEE (Autoridad de
Energía Eléctrica), along with a voluntary team of city employees (many who were electricians)
to assist. The city purchased a used power line truck and mobilized the makeshift electrical team
to restore electricity to the township of 40,000 people. The new electrical team focused on safety
and connecting power one home at a time. The mayor called his electrical team the PPA (Pepino
Power Authority) after the nearby Pepino Mountains and started repairing the destroyed and
dilapidated electrical lines within the township. Restoring power throughout the township
allowed property owners to begin rebuilding.

4.2.2

Fajardo
While in Puerto Rico, an interview was also conducted with the Mayor of Fajardo. The

township of Fajardo is located on the eastern side of the island, near the area that the hurricane
made landfall.
The mayor of Fajardo had been in office since 1988. He was a very talkative 72-year-old
and was eager to discuss his township. The mayor mentioned he was in Puerto Rico when
Hurricane Hugo hit in 1989. The biggest difference he saw between Hugo and Maria was the
fact that Hugo was not a big enough storm to go over the mountains of the island, but Maria
traveled much further. He mentioned that they were blessed to have the US military come in
after Hurricane Maria and help deliver fuel. The fuel was needed for the equipment and vehicles
used to clear debris after Hurricane Maria. His township is located on the east coast, close to
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where Maria made landfall. The mayor of Fajardo set up a task force team to help distribute
food after the hurricane had passed.
Part of the mayor of Fajardo’s recovery plan to assist residents in the Fajardo township
was a method of going house to house to check on the citizens’ well-being. Citizens would meet
at local churches and baseball fields in the township to get food. They designated a church in
each of their areas where food could be distributed. They followed this process with the help of
the food bank and FEMA for 6 months.
In order to open up the roads after the storm, the mayor’s plan included sending
employees home before the storm with township equipment such as dozers and frontend loaders
to their respective barrios. After the storm, employees could use the heavy equipment to clear
paths and make their way back to the township center. This action opened their local roads to
create access to the main parts of the township and island. The mayor’s wife was also
instrumental in helping with the social aspects of ensuring the citizens of Fajardo felt hope, were
cared for, and fed.
According to the mayor of Fajardo, working with FEMA was not a pleasant experience.
As of July 2018, the township of Fajardo was still owed 6 million dollars, according to the
mayor’s office. After a year of working with them, he explained that the estimators and
insurance companies were not willing to pay enough to cover individual damages. The Army
Core of Engineers was able to do major clean up in general and quickly. The people in the
Fajardo township all pitched in during the cleaning up process.
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4.2.3

Loiza
The third mayor that the research interviewed was the mayor of Loiza, one of the poorer

townships on the island. Loiza has a population of roughly 26,000 people and is considered a
low-income area (average annual income is $17,402) (US Census Bureau, 2020). The township
had a significant amount of informal/illegal construction that was destroyed by Hurricane Maria
and most residents were not eligible for official assistance due to the informal/illegal
construction nature of their residences. The research team learned that 85% of the Loiza
township is in a major flood zone. In 1988 when Hurricane Hugo hit Puerto Rico, flooding
destroyed much of Loiza, and the residents at that time moved away. The poorer social class
slowly moved into the deserted township after Hurricane Hugo and began to populate the area
once again. A general observation by the research team of the area in July 2018 found that Loiza
was still quite despondent. According to the Mayor’s office, as of July 2018, over 437 homes
still had temporary roofs and the roof of the Loiza city offices was damaged by the storm and
still leaked.
During our interview with the mayor of Loiza, she implied that the federal government
had not done enough for their township and they were still waiting for someone else to help
them. Her attitude was that she was waiting for the federal government to do more for their
rebuilding efforts. The mayor estimated it would take more than 5 years to recuperate / rebuild.
Her attitude was remarkably different than the other two mayors that the research team
interviewed. She had determined that unless the federal government did more for her township,
things would most likely not improve. Perhaps if she had a similar attitude and post hurricane
plan as the other mayors the research team interviewed, her township would be farther along in
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the recovery process than they were at the time of the interview. She might have
motivated/inspired the people in Loiza to be more self-reliant.

Meeting with Local Contractors – Reconstruction Progress
Interviewing local contractors was important to the research team to get a firsthand
account of how construction companies reacted and were involved in the rebuilding efforts in
Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria. The goal was to also understand the construction industry
both before and after the hurricane. The research team had pre-established a set of baseline
questions to ask these research participants, but their experiences were so unique and their
responses so broad that a formal summary of the survey results was not applicable. The
following summaries are for those interviews that specifically were connected to residential
reconstruction efforts.

4.3.1

GW Construction
The research team met with GW Construction, a firm that builds factories, large custom

homes, and hotels. During their interview, they explained that from a construction standpoint,
they have increased prices due to subcontractor labor price increases and material shortages.
They mentioned both were a result of Hurricane Maria. For example, getting windows for their
custom home projects required about 12 months lead time as of July 2018, which was more than
3 times as long as the normal lead time before the hurricane. The research team wanted to know
how their business was doing one year after the hurricane. GW Construction stated they were
seeing more work, had hired more employees, and were experiencing material shortages, but no
labor shortage. As of July 2018, their firm had 11 employees, but they constantly had others
who would step in if work were offered. Additionally, they stated it took much longer to get
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estimates from trade partners and suppliers. GW Construction stated they had a backlog plenty
of work and were being paid well because their projects were from private clients and not
government bids.

4.3.2

Integra Design Group
Integra Design Group gave the research team the opportunity for an interview. The

director of the architecture department was the prime individual present during the interview.
Integra is a large design, engineering, and construction firm. They were asked if their business
strategy had changed after Hurricane Maria. They explained that immediately following the
hurricane their firm changed the focus of how they worked on their projects. One week after the
disaster, they were able to return to work. For their clients, Integra immediately implemented a
structural assessment, job visits, and a photo documentation program, so they could document
the damages caused by the hurricane. Integra’s plan to keep their clients’ interests as priority
number one after Hurricane Maria had paid dividends for future work for Integra. At the
approximate year mark after Hurricane Maria, Integra had a good backlog of clients / projects
due to their commitment to the customer.
Integra’s director of architecture informed the research team that before Hurricane Maria,
smaller contractors were not busy, and that the construction industry in Puerto Rico, had been
declining for at least 10 years. In July 2018, approximately one year after Hurricane Maria, any
contractor who wanted work was busy, especially roofing contractors. The director of
architecture mentioned that a major challenge all construction companies were facing after
Hurricane Maria was price controls. Costs had dramatically increased after the hurricane. For
example, the cost of a CMU (concrete masonry unit) went from $0.60 per block to $1.00 per
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block. The director also estimated at least 60% of construction on the island was illegal, or
informal construction. He explained that in most urban areas, the second-floor construction of
many homes was made of wood, not built to any type of code minimums, and without permits.
This type of second story structure received a lot of damage from the Hurricane Maria.
Another construction material / pricing challenge that construction companies faced was
the material inventory added tax that companies had to pay per Puerto Rican government
regulations if they stock piled inventory / construction materials on the island. Therefore, many
construction companies on the island of Puerto Rico, would wait and bring materials from the
U.S. mainland via shipping vessels to the island only when needed for a specific project. This
tax regulation created a material shortage because most private companies try to avoid extra
taxation. Waiting to ship materials from the U.S. mainland until it is needed, only increased the
lead time of construction materials. The director of architecture at Integra stated that most
Puerto Ricans are more reactive than proactive. He stated, “They would rather wait until it’s
necessary to solve a large problem, rather than intervene sooner with a plan to prevent further
damages or problems.” According to the director of architecture, there are no formal functioning
government building inspectors on the island; therefore, there is no enforcement of government
code. Projects being monitored or inspected regularly are large scale projects that are managed
by licensed architects and engineers whose firms are accountable for the inspections and proper
construction of each project. This process is usually applicable for government and commercial
projects. Residential construction projects are often left unregulated and uninspected.
At the conclusion of the interview with Integra Design Group, the director of architecture
made the comment “poor people have poor ways.” He went on to explain that there was a street
named “Via Hugo” in the township of Loiza, which is an area that was destroyed by Hurricane
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Hugo in 1988 where the poorer class have flocked to and taken over in the years since. They
built in that area even though it was in a high danger area for flooding, but because no one else
rebuilt there, the poorer class felt it was their best solution. This helps explain why Loiza is
overrun with informal construction.

4.3.3

Desarrolladora J.A. Inc.
The research team was able to secure an interview with the vice president of

Desarrolladora J.A. Inc., which is primarily a heavy-civil contractor. The vice president was also
the president of the Association of General Contractors, Puerto Rico chapter at the time of the
interview. The research team learned from Desarrolladora J.A. Inc. that from 2005 up until
September 2017, the construction industry in Puerto Rico was shrinking and depressed. New
construction had been declining in Puerto Rico. After the devastation of Hurricane Maria, and
due to the rebuilding / reconstruction needs in all sectors of construction, one year after
Hurricane Maria, the construction industry was booming in Puerto Rico. Desarrolladora J.A.
Inc. informed the research team that construction projections showed 5 to 10 years of positive
work growth in just the rebuilding efforts of damages caused by Hurricane Maria. When asked
what immediate lessons learned and challenges faced after the hurricane, Desarrolladora J.A.
indicated all current projects were stalled for at least 3 months. Due to FEMA paying truck
drivers 3 times more per load to haul off hurricane debris than they would receive for hauling a
load of material to a construction site, work on existing large projects came to a standstill.
Another challenge that construction companies faced after Hurricane Maria was price
controls. Rebar, which is used in all facets of construction in Puerto Rico, went from $0.39 per
lb. to $0.70 per lb. 3000 PSI concrete, which is also used in many facets of construction on the
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island, increased from $80 per cubic yard to $90 per cubic yard. A big lesson many larger
construction companies who were members of the AGC (Association of General Contractors)
stated they learned was the importance of cash flow. Directly after Hurricane Maria, many trade
contractors would only accept payment in cash. If a company did not have a good cash flow and
reserves in the bank, they could not guarantee prompt payment, and therefore, many trade
contractors would not work for them. Cash was king immediately after the hurricane.

4.3.4

Donato Design and Development Group
In an interview with one of the architects at DDD Group, a design, construction

management, and consultation firm, the architect expressed that most engineers and architects in
Puerto Rico would like to see required construction design minimums to withstand hurricane
force winds up to 200 mph. She lived in Puerto Rico through Hurricane Hugo as well, and the
architect explained that Hugo seemed like a baby storm in comparison to Hurricane Maria. She
explained that the township of Yabucoa, where the hurricane made landfall is the area that
received the most severe devastation.
When asked about illegal / informal construction in Puerto Rico, the DDD Group
architect stated she believed at least half of all construction on the island was illegal, or informal
construction. Building inspections in Puerto Rico are the responsibility of county officials but
are not efficient. She stated that many homeowners do not want to spend money or take time to
get permits for proper building compliance to take place, so they hire chiveros, who are
inexpensive, unskilled laborers, often from the Dominican Republic. Those workers begin to
build without any type of plans or knowledge. This construction method lends itself to a more
cost-efficient approach initially, but more expensive in the long term.
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After the research team saw the damages to a home on the coast of Puerto Rico due to
deteriorating/delaminating rebar, the research team asked if epoxy-coated rebar was required for
construction in Puerto Rico. The architect stated epoxy coated rebar is not required, and it is
typical for older rebar to become de-laminated in coastal areas due to humidity and exposure to
the elements. Many poor homeowners build homes/additions a little at a time causing exposure
to elements. Most homeowners build as time and money / materials allow. It is common to see
rebar sticking vertically out of the corners of unfinished concrete block structures for months, if
not years before the wall is completed. The humidity and salty coastal air create a natural
consequence of deteriorating the reinforcing steel that is left exposed to the elements. Further
testing would need to be done to determine the loss of strength of the reinforcing steel that is left
exposed to the elements for an extended period.

4.3.5

Casas Borincanas
In an interview with the owner of Casas Borincanas, a contractor / developer with over 30

years of experience building on the island of Puerto Rico, he stated that the homes he had built
did not receive major damage from Hurricane Maria. Casas Borincanas builds as well as sells
engineered home kits that are approved (engineered) to be built in all areas of the island and are
designed to withstand hurricane forces. The Casas Borincanas owner explained that concrete
homes that were built to current code standards did not sustain much damage from Hurricane
Maria. Since Hurricane Maria, Casas Borincanas has seen an increased demand of people
wanting to buy their homes or the engineered home kits they sell.
Casas Borincanas has seen issues involving the selling of pre-engineered home kits to
potential clients who hope to rebuild with one of their home plans. Many families who lost
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entire homes and want to rebuild did not carry insurance on their existing home, therefore, the
burden of their catastrophic loss falls completely on themselves. Additionally, even though
FEMA came to Puerto Rico with intentions to help the people financially in their time of need,
the maximum allowable payout for 2017 disasters was $33,300. This money was not intended to
“fill the hole” but rather “cover a gap.” Many Puerto Ricans submitted claims to FEMA hoping
to “fill the hole”, but 73% of those claims were denied. One of the main reasons so many claims
were denied was because many homeowners do not have titles or legal deeds to their property.
Without legal proof of ownership, FEMA cannot pay out on a claim.
The Small Business Administration had also been active in Puerto Rico, providing loan
assistance to residents whose homes were lost or damaged due to Hurricane Maria. Casas
Borincanas stated that it was difficult for people to qualify for the loans. The approval process
was difficult because it required documentation that many potential clients did not have (such as
title / property deeds to the land where they would like to build).
According to the owner of Casas Borincanas, he said that approximately 35 to 40
thousand people (in more remote areas of the island) were still without power 10 months later.
With the knowledge that other contractors on the island were experiencing material shortages,
the research team asked Casas Borincanas if their company was experiencing material shortages
due to the high demand for the home kits they were selling. Casas Borincanas stated they were
not experiencing a shortage. They explained the reason they were not affected by material
shortages was because his business owned warehouses where they stored between 70 to 100 of
their home kits.
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The research team also asked how Casas Borincanas ensured that their home kits were
built to proper specifications. He indicated that each home kit sold includes a $650 engineering
inspection fee that is used to pay a licensed engineer to inspect the project during construction.

4.3.6

Tu Hogar Renace Trade Contractor
The research team met at a reconstruction site with a trade contractor who was repairing a

roof damaged by the effects of Hurricane Maria. This trade contractor worked for the Tu Hogar
Renace program, a HUD sponsored government program for helping non-catastrophic hurricane
repair needs. Tu Hogar Renace translates to Your Home Reborn. In this program, homeowners
would apply for repairs and government approved adjusters were sent out to verify legitimate
damages. Approvals were based on adjuster recommendations and once approved; the trade
contractors were allowed to make the necessary repairs. Contractors were paid directly through
the program and not by the homeowners. Figure 4-3 is a picture of the home that the research
team visited. At this site, the roofing contractor showed typical roofing repairs for damages from
Hurricane Maria for flat concrete roofed homes. Structurally, the home that was being repaired
was fine, but the concrete roof had begun leaking after all the rainfall from the hurricane.

Figure 4-3: Site visit to concrete flat roofed home damaged by Hurricane Maria.
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The research team wanted to talk with someone firsthand who was involved in the
reconstruction efforts of helping put people’s lives back to some sense of normalcy. During the
interview, the roofing trade contractor mentioned that with his current workload of roofing
repairs, he and his crew of 6 employees had at least two years of work ahead of them fixing
claims that were caused by Hurricane Maria. He and his team usually began work at 7 am and
would work until 8 or 9 pm each evening, for 6 days a week. When asked how he scheduled the
work ahead of him, he explained that adjustors that would process the claims before he ever got
to a job, and he would receive a form with the location of the job to repair and what repairs were
approved for him to do. He explained that the storm was a terrible thing for Puerto Rico to go
through, but because of the rebuilding needs after the storm, his company had benefited with a
full workload for years to come.

Visiting Residential Properties
Interviews with homeowners who experienced the storm and the destruction of their
homes was important to see how the rebuilding process was proceeding. The research team
visited with owners from several parts of the island to find out how the storm had affected them
and how the rebuilding process was proceeding for them. The summary contained in this thesis
includes the most important elements from those interviews related to the residential construction
process. In speaking with individuals, four common responses were discovered. Some persons
had received financial assistance and had completed the repairs to their homes. Others had
received approval for assistance and were waiting for repair work to be completed on their
homes. A third group did not receive substantial damage from the storm and did not request
government assistance. And the last group received substantial damage, including some who
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experienced a complete loss of their home, but did not qualify for government assistance to
repair / rebuild their homes.
Although there were minimal site visits made, the research team was able to make
extensive observations regarding the types of damage that occurred to residential structures. All
the homes on the island were subjected to extreme wind loads. Reinforced concrete homes fared
well in the high winds. The team noted that some reinforced concrete structures still had blue
tarps but did not appear to have structural damage. It was also observed that some wood framed
structures survived the high winds. This is likely due to better construction methods being used.
On the other hand, wood framed homes that were destroyed from the winds appeared to be
informal/illegal construction. Homes that were built along the ocean front were also exposed to
storm surge and wave damage. The structures built in these areas all appeared to have structural
damage. Reinforced concrete homes faced partial structural damage, including lateral
displacements, foundation undermining, and significant flooding. Wood frame homes typically
experienced complete failure, in many cases simply leaving behind a bare foundation.
After the research team visited with the owner of Casas Borincanas, they had the
opportunity to visit a home reconstruction site using a purchased home kit from Casas
Borincanas. The homeowner explained the destroyed home had been a wood structure. The roof
blew off during the hurricane, allowing rain to come in and flood the home, ruining everything
inside. Figure 4-4 shows the construction of new block walls on an existing foundation after
they finished tearing everything else down due to the mold and water damage. The homeowner
said family and friends helped them clean up the debris of the ruined home. They did not have
any government agency help in cleaning up their property. Figure 4-5 shows new bathroom
plumbing roughed in the existing foundation. Figure 4-6 shows a code compliant residential
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reconstruction site and permit information was displayed onsite. When asked how they were
paying for the reconstruction, the owner stated that they were using a combination of insurance
money, a Small Business Association loan, and private loans to pay for their new home.

Figure 4-4: New wall construction on an existing foundation.
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Figure 4-5: New plumbing cut into existing foundation.
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Figure 4-6: Typical code compliant reconstruction for destroyed home.

During a visit to the township of Yabucoa, a community along the eastern side of Puerto
Rico where Hurricane Maria made landfall, the research team met a homeowner whose home
was built right along the coastline overlook with the ocean in their backyard some 20 feet below.
She explained that she had lived in that home with her husband for over forty years. Her
husband, who was blind, and in his sixties, was born in that home. As the team looked around, it
did not appear that there was much of any home left to inhabit (see Figure 4-7). The homeowner
then led the group down the hill toward the ocean and into a lower level of what was left of their
home. Figure 4-8 shows the damaged concrete ceiling due to the crashing storm surge that had
inundated the home. It was apparent that the structural integrity of the home had been
significantly impacted by the storm. The home was still without power, but the owners had a
small generator that they used a few hours each day to provide nighttime light and it charged a
small freezer someone had donated to them after the hurricane. The owners described how
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devastating the storm was and that they did not qualify for FEMA help. 10 months after the
storm they were still living in what was left of their home with no plan or finances to rebuild.

Figure 4-7: Remains of a beachfront home in Yabucoa.

Figure 4-8: Concrete spalling and deteriorating reinforcing steel in damaged ceiling.
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A few hundred feet farther down the shoreline, the research team met another homeowner
whose home had also been destroyed by the hurricane. This woman was living with her two
daughters in what was left of her home: four concrete walls with a blue tarp for a roof (see
Figure 4-9). During the storm, she found refuge in a restaurant that had an elevation higher up
on the hillside. The roof of her home had been washed away by the storm surge and the
reinforced concrete exterior walls of her home had been severely damaged (see Figure 4-10).
She was also still without electricity and her original septic system and drain field had been
washed away into the sea.

Figure 4-9: FEMA blue tarp roof on existing home in Yabucoa.
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Figure 4-10: Damaged exterior concrete walls of home.

She was one of the few (percentage wise) that had all required documentation necessary
to be approved for financial help by FEMA. In taking a closer look at the exterior concrete walls
still standing on her home (Figure 4-10), the concrete had flaked away in many spots, exposing
the reinforcing steel (rebar). Figure 4-11 shows that the reinforcing steel was delaminating and
flaking apart. It was obvious that the strength of the reinforcing steel embedded in the concrete
walls of her home was compromised; however, to what extent is unknown without further
investigation and strength testing. This homeowner informed the research team that she had
been paid approximately $8,000 dollars by FEMA for help with repairs to her home. When
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asked what repairs she had been able to complete with the funds, she told the research team,
“none.” She had used the money to buy concrete block, reinforcing steel, cement, and windows
to build an addition to her home. When the research team was on site, she showed us the new
half constructed walls with reinforcing steel projecting out the top of them. She stated that she
had run out of money and was applying for more assistance. When asked about the plan to
replace her roof, she mentioned that she was waiting for a church organization that had told her
they would help her replace her roof. This specific case represents an occurrence that was quite
common. Homeowners typically felt that the FEMA assistance was not sufficient to replace the
damaged roof. However, it was common for homeowners who received financial assistance to
use the money for other repairs, or in this case a home addition.

Figure 4-11: Delaminating reinforcing steel in reinforced concrete wall.
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During another exploration day on the island, the research team visited an area of
beachfront properties along the north central part of the island. This area was known for its
black sand beaches. While observing and documenting the damages to the homes along the
beachfront area, it was apparent that the storm surge waves had washed away the beach and
undermined the foundations of the homes along the beach, causing the homes to break up and
fall into the sea. While taking photos of the area, an owner of one of the residences drove up and
put a for sale sign on the door of what was left of his home. He shared his story of the
devastation with the research team. His home had been there for at least 40 years and his wife
grew up in that home. When they were first married and living there, the shoreline of the ocean
was approximately 200 yards away from his home. Over the years there was a demand for the
black sand that made up the shoreline where they lived, and people started loading up the black
sand in trucks and hauling it off. The removal of the black sand over the years had left the
homes in that area within 50 yards of the sea. When the storm surge from Hurricane Maria
battered the north side of the island, there was no beach of any substantial distance left between
the homes and the water’s edge. During the storm, the large waves battered the compromised
shoreline and undermined the home foundations and the houses fell into the sea (see Figures 412 and 4-13). When asked about his plan for recovery or FEMA assistance, he explained that
they did not qualify for FEMA assistance because they did not have a title for their property and
home. He had attempted to get a loan from a bank to rebuild, but the restaurant he owned was
also flooded and damaged, so he was unable to work and did not have a job and therefore did not
qualify for a loan. He explained that he and his wife had determined to leave the island and go
live with their daughter who was living in Florida.
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Figure 4-12: Homes destroyed at water’s edge by storm surge.

Figure 4-13: Owner explaining how the storm had undermined the foundation.
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Current Challenges and Deficiencies
The people of Puerto Rico still face many challenges caused by the effects of the storm.
Some must travel extended distances to arrive at familiar places because the shortest / most
common route is still not passable. Others must decide whether it is worth starting over and
rebuilding on Puerto Rican soil, or abandoning their roots and leave the island for a fresh start.
Either way the decision is not easy, and many hard days are still ahead.
The research team noted that close to a year after the storm made landfall on the island,
there were still many deficiencies in Puerto Rico resulting from damages caused by Hurricane
Maria. Many reinforced concrete homes did not sustain structural damage but the sustained
winds and rainfall from the storm caused the roofs to leak. Many of those leaky roofs still await
repairs. City street lighting was collapsed and intersection semi-fores were still not working or
repaired in several locations throughout the island. Several Roads and bridges were also still in
need of repair in many areas of the island. Many locations throughout the island still had debris
and trash still lying where it fell during the storm or was heaped up in piles from partial cleanup
of the hurricane damages (see Figure 4-14). There were still many roofs needing to be fixed (as
seen in Figure 4-15 with the recognizable “Blue Tarp Roof”). The home shown in Figure 4-15
appears to be structurally sound but was still awaiting roof repairs ten months after the hurricane
passed. The research team noted many homes, as seen in Figure 4-16, that had an uninhabitable
wood frame second stories that had been destroyed by the hurricane. It was clear that these
structures represented the far too common informal construction practices and were not eligible
for federal assistance. But the construction industry was doing their part by making strides each
day and week to rebuild what was lost to mother nature.
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Figure 4-14: Hurricane Damage left in place.
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Figure 4-15: Blue tarped roof.

Figure 4-16: Home with uninhabitable second story wood framed construction.
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Discussion and Summary of Lessons Learned

4.6.1

Cultural Challenges
There are cultural challenges that Puerto Ricans face as they move forward with life after

Hurricane Maria. Puerto Rico does not have a thriving business economy. Many of the younger
generation who desire a higher education come to the United States mainland to attend school.
Often those students end up staying in the United States because they see more and better
economic opportunities on the mainland than on the island of Puerto Rico. As the younger
generation continues to leave the island, the older generation is left behind with their traditional
ways of living, causing customs and culture to stay the same. During several interviews with
younger adults on the island, the research team was told that many had already left the island
with no plans to return and others were in the process of finalizing plans to leave because the
hurricane had destroyed everything they had, and they had decided if they were going to start
over, they would do it on the mainland of the United States. Puerto Rico is a culture of multigenerational family living. It is not uncommon for newlyweds to live with their parents. Often,
the younger generation family ends up building or adding on to the existing home to create a
little more space or privacy for their family. It is common that those construction additions are
built with less expensive materials that are purchased from the local home improvement “box
store” with no intent to build to hurricane codes standards. These types of structures are often
built by unskilled workers, using informal construction methods = sometimes even the families
themselves construct something together the best they can. This generational pattern creates
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many problems with ownership of property as well as the structures being unsafe for dwelling
and most certainly not safe in the face of a hurricane.

4.6.2

Different Municipalities – Different Priorities – Proactive vs. Reactive
By interviewing different municipality leaders, the research team found differences in the

ideas and approaches to handling the aftermath of the hurricane. When interviewing Fajardo’s
municipality leader, he explained his actions and hurricane plans to the research team. Not only
did the township governing team handle the aftermath, they had prepared before the hurricane
hit. Fajardo’s township employees were sent home with heavy equipment needed before the
storm made landfall so they could dig out debris to access roads back to the city center after the
storm was over. After the hurricane, those employees worked together as they dug out the debris
to open the rest of the streets in the municipality.
Without power and stores closed, Fajardo city employees went from house to house to
assess needs and encouraged residents to meet in nearby churches and ball fields to collect
supplies and food. There was a central church in each barrio that distributed food to residents for
approximately 6 months. Other township leaders did not have the same type of proactive prehurricane plan; rather, they opted to sit out the storm and wait for help.

4.6.3

Government Regulations and FEMA
In multiple interviews while on the island, the research team was told that approximately

60 percent of the construction built on the island of Puerto Rico was illegal construction, or what
some term informal construction. That means approximately 60 percent of all construction
taking place on the island was/is built without a permit, without engineered plans, or without
proper inspections to ensure that life-safety standards are being met. The research team did find
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owners who had deeds to the land they were building on and had permits and had hired an
engineer to inspect the work of the new construction; however, a majority, when asked, did not
have permits or even plans.
FEMA reported that 73% of all claims from Hurricane Maria were initially denied.
Many of the claims were denied due to lack of proof of ownership or property title or the illegal /
informal construction also did not qualify for FEMA relief. In discussions with multiple
individuals who had a FEMA claim denied, the individuals felt that FEMA just did not care
about “their” situation.
The Federal Government (FEMA) was not sufficient and was a challenge for many
hurricane victims who thought they could rely on this agency to “save” them. Like any
government institution there are rules and regulations. FEMA offers relief to those who qualify,
but they were limited to $33,300 per claim. The first thing FEMA offered were blue tarps to
provide some shelter from rain and to help prevent mold. Tarps were distributed to anyone that
requested without submitting a claim. 18 months of rent was also available to those who lost
their home if the applicant qualified.
One big misunderstanding with the Puerto Rican people was they assumed FEMA would
step in and provide an entirely new rebuilt home. Their perception of FEMA was misinformed.
FEMA’s role was to help residents with initial recovery, but not to cover every expense of
rebuilding. FEMA also had the role of educating people on the rebuilding process. This was a
great frustration point for many residents. A major issue FEMA addressed after the hurricane
subsided was to quickly cover roofs of homes that had been destroyed or blown away during the
storm with the recognizable “blue tarp roof” to prevent further damage to the homes from rain.
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In addition to financial help, a major focus for FEMA was recovery education. FEMA
assisted after the hurricane with teaching residents how to clean up their homes from the water
damage. FEMA also instructed citizens how to thoroughly disinfect their homes with bleach to
avoid unsanitary conditions such as mold or infections. During a visit with FEMA employees,
the research team learned that FEMA also assisted in teaching the residents how to rebuild their
homes properly. One FEMA employee stated that many roofs leaked after the storm, so the tarps
were used to “replace” the missing roofs. FEMA had many tutorials / how-to step by step
instructions on how to fix up / rebuild damaged structures on their website. FEMA provided
many illustrated handouts of proper construction methods that were available for people to use
and follow when rebuilding damaged parts of their homes. FEMA representatives in Puerto Rico
also explained that one of the largest obstacles was teaching people how to properly build a roof
that didn’t leak.
Some individuals qualified for SBA (small business administration) loans for rebuilding.
These loans required the homeowner to keep receipts of all rebuilding costs in case they were
audited. After 1 year the borrowers were required to start paying back the loans. Many of the
SBA loan applications were rejected for the same reason that FEMA applications were rejected,
because homeowners did not have property deed or title to the property where they lived.
Without proper property deeds, the Small Business Administration could not process and
approve a reconstruction loan.

4.6.4

Cultural Poverty
The Latin culture of Puerto Rico is very laid back and Puerto Rico has extreme poverty

throughout many areas of the island. The research team noticed the worst damages to residences

68

appeared to be in areas of greater poverty. This fact is outside the bounds of this thesis, but it is
worth noting that the poorer areas of the island appeared to sustain more substantial damage. It
is likely that this substantial damage is caused in part because there is not a functioning building
inspection enforcement department on the island ensuring that construction is built to proper
Hurricane minimum standards. The township of Loiza is evidence of this, in that much of the
township lies below the storm surge flood plain and was wiped out after Hurricane Hugo in
1988. However, many impoverished people inhabited the area after that hurricane and now,
some 30 years later, were found in the same situation with destroyed and flooded residences in
the aftermath of Hurricane Maria.

4.6.5

Process of Rebuilding Needs to Change
The research team noted that many materials sold / used in Puerto Rico were

used/installed in ways that would not be able to survive a hurricane storm. Wood frame
structures typically do not withstand a category 5 storm, but anyone can go to the local home
improvement store in Puerto Rico and find dimensional lumber is plentiful and available for
purchase (see Figure 4-17). Reinforced CMU walls built properly are sufficient to withstand
category 5 winds due to the addition of reinforcing steel. However, when built periodically over
a number of years and the reinforcing steel is left exposed to the elements for years before a wall
is built, the exposure to the humid, salty sea air elements can cause failure in the reinforcing steel
and weaken it (see Figure 4-18). Structural steel is also a viable option. Both options
(reinforced CMU walls and structural steel) are more expensive than dimensional lumber
construction. Wood structures can be made to withstand hurricane force winds, but only through
careful design, proper execution, and additional material/fastener devises.
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Figure 4-17: Inexpensive dimension lumber at home improvement store.
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Figure 4-18: Second story masonry addition in progress.

It is reasonably apparent that the poorer social class defaults to wood construction due to
its low cost and easy access on the island. To lessen the damages of the next hurricane, the
Puerto Rican government needs an agency (inspection services) that actively monitors new
construction. Most private and government buildings and structures on the island are built to
hurricane standards. The problem lies with individual, private residences. A permit process
would help alleviate the burden of illegal construction. When legally permitted to build, the
inspections would then become necessary. Inspections would ensure greater quality structures.
One of the greatest challenges to overcome is the lack of proof of ownership to land.
Younger generations stay close to family, which means they tend to build on, or build a second
level not according to any building code. It is not uncommon for multigenerational families to
live in one residence. When the younger generation comes of age, they want to stay close by.
To save money, they add on to the parent’s structures and build with lower quality materials and
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without proper knowledge they are building structures that are unsafe. As they are adding on
without any proper documentation, there is no way to insure the properties. They are also
exempt from FEMA claims since they are not owners of that portion of property.

4.6.6

How Can the Island Improve Residential Building Practices?
On the small island of Puerto Rico, the population is 3.4 million people. Many of the

poorer class are not formally educated. After the hurricane, many relied on the government for
food to survive. The Puerto Rican government itself has had and continues to have serious
financial problems. Many of the larger general contractors on the island will not do work for the
Puerto Rican government because they do not want to be paid in “I.O. U.’s.” Unless the contract
is with the federal government, those companies will not do business with the state government.
It will take years to improve building practices. If the federal government were to fund the
creation of an island wide building department, perhaps the local building practices would
improve more quickly.

4.6.7

How Can the State Monitor Building Quality?
The creation of a working state entity, primarily needed for residential single family, DIY

type construction would help ensure that building quality improves. The commercial,
government and privately funded construction projects do not have an issue with quality because
they are monitored and controlled by architects and engineers that ensure that quality and code
minimums are followed. The real quality problems lie in the lower income residential areas.
A large obstacle was a lack of inspections for residential properties. One company
(Casas Borincanas) that sells and builds housing kits that do-it-yourself residents can purchase,
has found a way to ensure their home kits are built properly. Each item needed for the new
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home, from the windows to the faucets to the electrical wire, is included in the sale of the DIY
kit. As part of the package purchase, the cost of an engineer is included to monitor the building
process. Through this method, quality construction is ensured.

4.6.8

Construction Labor Needs are High – Plenty of Work Right Now
The rebuilding needs due to the destruction of Hurricane Maria have caused the

construction industry to rebound from its anemic past decade. There is plenty of construction
work available. Thru interviews with construction companies on the island the research team
learned that there is a shortage of skilled and knowledgeable construction laborers. There are
plenty of people willing to work and fill labor positions but lack the education for proper skilled
construction needs. Without enough skilled laborers to manage and oversee the unskilled
laborers, proper construction practices will not happen.
Before the storm hit Puerto Rico, the island was experiencing a construction recession. It
began around 2006. For example, in 2005 Las Piedras Construction employed approximately
800 people and completed $60-$80 million annually. After 2006 as the building industry
declined, Las Piedras only employed 150 employees and did $30 million annually. Prior to
Hurricane Maria, construction was still on that downward trend.
Since Hurricane Maria, many residents of Puerto Rico have turned to unskilled laborers
or informal construction to save money on rebuilding, which means the construction is likely not
built to code. Because many of the FEMA claims were declined, along with a lack of property
deeds, residents are sticking with their old ways of construction. They feel that continuing to
build in the tradition of adding on with inexpensive materials is their only option. The

73

frustration is understandable and there are many changes at the government local levels that need
to be implemented to see the overall changes in residential construction in Puerto Rico.

4.6.9

How Can They Fill the Labor Need for Smaller Jobs?
It is unclear how the labor needs can be filled on the island when there is a shortage of

skilled construction labor not only in Puerto Rico, but across the mainland of the United States.
In talking to one homeowner, he saw that many Puerto Ricans who do become educated leave
the island and move to the mainland of the United States for better paying jobs and easier
lifestyle. There are companies who actively recruit young graduates from Puerto Rico to come
to the United States mainland to work in the construction industry. Educated Puerto Rican
engineers and construction managers are greatly needed on the island, as well as an increase in
programs and opportunities for preparing a much-needed workforce of skilled laborers.

4.6.10 How Can Citizens Acquire the Proper Insurance?
The research team found that most lower income residences did not carry insurance. This
was typically because either the property owners could not afford to pay insurance or the
property that they built / lived in was not insurable according to insurance standards. Another
reason why lower income residences do not have insurance is because many of the residences
were “illegal or squatter residences.” These residences were not built on deeded land, or they
were built on top of existing structures. When food and shelter are the primary basics of life for
the impoverished population in Puerto Rico, the thought of homeowner’s insurance does not
even register as something necessary to persons in that situation. When future storms strike, the
perpetuating cycle of informal construction practices will be enhanced and simply continue for
those without proper insurance.
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5

CONCLUSIONS

Project Summary
2017 was an unprecedented year of hurricane destruction in the Caribbean and gulf
region. Three category 4 hurricanes made landfall in a 30-day period on U.S. soil. Based on
historical models that FEMA used to predict future preparedness, the amount of Federal aid
needed was not adequately anticipated. For future reference, 2017 will stand out as a severe year
for natural disasters. Unfortunately, by the time Hurricane Maria made landfall as the third
category 4 hurricane to make landfall on U.S. soil in 30 days, many federal resources had already
been exhausted before others became available. Because Hurricane Maria caused an
unprecedented disaster scenario, it was not known how the construction industry would respond
to the rebuilding efforts, especially regarding the residential construction industry in Puerto Rico
and the rebuilding efforts. Therefore, this was a unique opportunity to perform this research. A
goal of the research was to target one-year post hurricane construction efforts, so as to get a good
feel for the lessons learned during the first year of rebuilding and to find out the effects for longterm reconstruction efforts.
In late July 2018, a small research group from the Brigham Young University
Construction Management program visited Puerto Rico to get a firsthand look into the
reconstruction efforts approximately a year after Hurricane Maria devastated the island. The
research was performed through personal interviews with local government leaders, contractors
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working in the reconstruction process, and homeowners who had experienced damaged or
destroyed homes due to the hurricane. A unique perspective was learned regarding the
residential construction efforts on the island Puerto Rico.

Summary of Research Objectives
The first objective was to find out what processes were utilized for rebuilding, i.e.,
clearing road access, ensuring people had food and water - basics of life, secure shelter - safe
places to live, and rebuilding their homes, etc. The research team wanted to know these basic
processes because they were viewed as necessary items that needed to be in place before
effective rebuilding could begin. FEMA learned from the hurricane events of 2017 that the
emergency plans in place for that year’s hurricane season were insufficient and has since
procured a larger reserve to be in place for future disaster events. Many individuals the research
team spoke with indicated that the state government of Puerto Rico was in financial disarray
before Hurricane Maria and therefore not prepared with sufficient emergency plans, equipment
resources, or finances to facilitate reconstruction efforts. The state appeared to be completely
dependent upon federal assistance and programs for rebuilding help. This dependent situation is
unique because many Puerto Ricans whose homes fell victim to storm damage felt that the
federal government (FEMA) would completely rebuild their damaged homes. When
homeowners realized that was not the case, many were at a loss as to how to rebuild, especially
those that were built illegally / informally to begin with. We discovered that major problems
with informal construction techniques, lack of building code enforcement and uninsurable
structures inhibited the effectiveness of the residential rebuilding process.
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Objectives two and three were to find current opportunities / challenges and to learn
about the residential construction outlook moving forward. Residential construction in Puerto
Rico as an industry was anemic at best before Hurricane Maria, but thanks to all the
rebuilding/reconstruction project opportunities (mostly funded by the Federal Government)
caused by the hurricane, the construction industry should see a boom for the next 10 years. Most
large local construction companies on the island are heavy civil/highway contractors and they
will be busy rebuilding the island for several years. That trend will in turn likely trickle down to
other disciplines of construction throughout the island. Smaller trade contractors, specifically
roofers, have plenty of opportunities for work. As reconstruction continues, it provides jobs for
many who were unemployed before the hurricane. However, the current labor challenge is to
find skilled labor that understands proper construction techniques and procedures.
Objective four was to target the perspectives of the different stakeholders to explore the
connections in the residential construction industry. Although we were specifically targeting the
residential construction industry, we felt that our research needed to understand the local
governments’ and homeowners’ points of view regarding proper residential rebuilding processes.
The local governments primary focus immediately after the hurricane was to ensure that basic
travel, infrastructure, and the ability to mobilize around the island were restored before effective
home reconstruction could begin. Through our research, we discovered that the residential
construction in Puerto Rico is a dichotomy of sorts. On the one side, there were homes that were
built to hurricane storm standards, which consequently as a whole, received minor damages from
the storm and were eligible for financial assistance from insurance and federal agencies. On the
other hand, there were homes that were built using illegal / informal construction techniques
which did not qualify for federal or private insurance financial assistance. Homeowners from
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this second group expressed a great deal of frustration with the rebuilding process because there
was no formal help available to them.

Lessons Learned
Self-reliance and initiative go a long way when it is time to dig in and get life back on
track. All residents in Puerto Rico found themselves without power and dealing with some level
of destruction after Hurricane Maria. The length of that power outage had much to do with how
rural the area was and how quickly debris could be cleared to allow equipment access to the area.
Dealing with the personal property destruction was more complicated. There were three key
issues that seemed to affect the repair or reconstruction of damaged homes: Was the home
insured, did the property owners have clear title / deeds for their property, and was the home
built to minimum hurricane construction standards or built illegally / informally?
Illegal / informal construction on the island of Puerto Rico has been a problem for many
years and continues to be such at the current time. As long as the human desires to create and
self-preserve exist, and the local “home improvement” store is not too far away, people of every
social class will strive to have a “shelter” of some sort over their head. Illegal / informal
construction is mostly evident in residential construction because “poor people have poor ways,”
as one resident stated. The desire to provide shelter for one’s family is greater than the desire to
pay the government for the right to construct a home on one’s property. Unfortunately, the
poorer class in many natural disasters are the ones who suffer and lose the most.
As long as illegal / informal construction continues to be allowed in Puerto Rico, those
who build to those informal construction sub-standards will be asking for federal assistance
again when the next “Hurricane Maria” hits the island. Informal construction is an issue for
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residential construction because of the lack of building code enforcement among single family
dwellings. There needs to be a social shift away from construction methods that do not meet
hurricane resistant minimums and a move toward implementing and teaching the long-term
benefits of construction code minimums. The territory of Puerto Rico needs to have a governing
entity that will enforce building codes and construction standards at all levels. Most homes that
experienced catastrophic loss, were homes that were built in either flood zone areas or built with
informal / illegal construction methods.
Proper construction education is key to helping the people of Puerto Rico understand the
necessity for code compliant residential minimums. A residential construction culture paradigm
shift needs to happen. The reference to residential construction culture is because most
commercial / civil construction is supervised and managed by licensed engineers who ensure
proper construction methods. Residential construction should not be allowed in known flood
zones to prevent catastrophic loss in those areas next time a hurricane makes landfall. One thing
is certain, Hurricane Maria was not the last major Hurricane to hit Puerto Rico. Therefore, if
residential construction methods are not changed / improved / enforced before the next big storm
event, Puerto Rico will be in the same situation it was in after Hurricane Maria.

Research Contribution
This research contributes to the knowledge that ultimately, the allowances of informal
construction in Puerto Rico cause human life to be more difficult. It is clear that Hurricane
Maria caused much destruction, but allowing informal / illegal construction practices to continue,
only sets the island up for failure when the next major hurricane makes landfall. Agencies must
change or become accountable, attitudes must shift, and public education about the “why” must
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be implemented. Estimates indicate that about half of the island’s residential construction is of
the informal/illegal variety. The island certainly needs a greater level of accountability and
education regarding residential construction practices.

Limitations of Research
The research followed a sound methodology for collecting a broad range of perspectives
with a limited number of interviews. This allowed the researchers to take a broad look at how
the various stakeholders were impacted collectively. However, this also limited the ability of the
researchers to provide definite solutions to the problems. In many ways, this research has been
more about simply defining different opportunities and challenges that existed between the
different stakeholders during the rebuilding effort. Additional lessons can be learned by studying
this in significantly greater depth.

Opportunities for Future Research
The valuable research accomplished by the team exploring the impacts of Hurricane
Maria and Irma on the residential construction industry of Puerto Rico could be further explored
through additional research. With the lessons learned in this thesis, opportunities for further
exploration include the following:
•

A study of why many young educated persons are leaving Puerto Rico and moving to
the U.S. mainland instead of staying and building homes and families in Puerto Rico.

•

A five-year follow-up study to see what construction standards have been
implemented, especially among the poorer class, to ensure a limited or reduced
number of informal / illegal construction residences.
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•

A long term (five or ten year) follow up study on the rebuilding efforts. Was the
debris taken care of? Are there still homes not rebuilt?

•

A more specific research approach about residential building codes and code
enforcement in Puerto Rico including plan review, standardized building inspections,
and code enforcement.

•

A study of the local political preparedness for future natural disasters.
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